The ANC will be watched closely to test claims that, whoever wins leadership in Polokwane next week, there will be no purge of the loser’s supporters.

Party caucus chair Vytjie Mentor says predictions of a fallout after the conference are wishful thinking.

That view may be wishful thinking. The main point of contact between parliament and ANC headquarters at Luthuli House is the political committee, and already that presents a potential clash. The committee is chaired by defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota. His deputy is SA deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. It is hard to imagine how Zuma, if he becomes party president, will interact with a man with whom he has traded insults and a woman whose rise is the result of his fall.

A senior MP says during the past two years the caucus has become more assertive, and there has been “a renewed willingness to engage”. It will be hard to reverse this, whoever wins.

Mentor notes that her own post has changed in the past only by promotion. Baleka Mbete became deputy speaker, Thabang Makwetla Mpumalanga premier and the late Joyce Khoali chair of the national council of provinces.

Episodes cited as examples of the caucus’s growing independence include the home affairs committee’s rebuke of minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula for failing to appear before it, the clash over perceived interference on the appointment of the SABC board and the rejection by the intelligence committee of the inspector-general’s report into the hoax e-mail saga.

The man who led that rejection is Siyabonga Cwele, chair man of the joint standing committee on intelligence and viewed as a rising star in a Zuma presidency. He expects no change in relationships after Polokwane. He points to a set of draft resolutions which argue that the executive and caucus should co-operate rather than try to dominate.

Steven Friedman of the Institute for Democracy in SA says the relationship will depend on factors such as the margin of victory and strategic decisions made by the new president. However, he points to a call by the alliance partners for Luthuli House to have an increasing role in parliament. If that happens, Friedman says, the caucus could become even more compliant. “Allowing Luthuli House a greater say will be a setback for democracy.”

Thabo Mbeki has always had a thing about history: he wants to make it.

Next week he might. If things go his way at the ANC conference, he will be party president of the ANC when it celebrates its centenary. It is more likely, though, that he will be the first sitting president of the ANC to be defeated in an election in 55 years. This is not the sort of history he had in mind.

For a man who has, both inside and outside the ANC, engineered such smooth and decisive electoral victories, how did it go so wrong?

The biggest mistake was to stand for election in the first place. Mbeki and his acolytes argue that no-one else from his camp is strong enough to defeat Zuma. The opposite is true. Countless ANC leaders in parliament and the provinces say they will vote for Zuma because they want Mbeki removed.

One wonders why none of Mbeki’s colleagues or friends has had the appetite to talk him out of it. Where were the likes of Saki Macozoma, Trevor Manuel or Joel Netshitenzhe when it came to the ANC’s hallmark collective approach to leadership? Many senior leaders in the cabinet and the ANC national executive committee (NEC) distanced themselves from the process, leaving it to less senior figures – such as deputy defence minister Mluleki George and ANC Youth League leader Andile Nkuhlu.

Mbeki’s critics say his failure to see the outcome is due to personality flaws, including an arrogance which has blind-sided him time and again. Says one: “He never imagined ANC members could choose a peasant from Nkandla above him, with all his accomplishments and intellectual prowess.”

Mbeki believed he could win because he – and the mainstream of the ANC – always had before. Controversial decisions like the demobilisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the suspension of sanctions prior to 1994 saw a handful of leaders sway a mass membership. Mbeki believed he could do it again.

He has also made serious political miscalculations in his re-election campaign. He counted on three things:

• The first was that ANC members would always make “rational and correct decisions”. These are the words used by individuals like Netshitenzhe over the past two years to explain why they were not panicked by Zuma’s popular mobilisation. As a result, Mbeki allies left their campaign very late. While Zuma’s cabinet supporters, such as housing minister Lindiwe Sisulu and deputy safety & security minister Susan Shabangu, are said to have worked hard behind the scenes, Mbeki’s ministers, with the exception of defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota, were aloof from lobbying.

As it has turned out, ANC members are neither rational nor unemotional in their choices. Their desire for change has proved a stronger underlying motivation than arguments for good governance.

• Mbeki’s second miscalculation was to count on the women’s vote. His promotion of women to his cabinet and high-ranking positions in provinces and cities has been a hallmark of his presidency. Contrast this with Zuma’s rape charge, and it would seem obvious that women would vote for Mbeki. Indeed, it appears that in the ANC Women’s League, which voted 29-25 for Zuma, the elite strata did back Mbeki. But for the grassroots, the affinity for Zuma and the desire for change was far stronger.

• Third, Mbeki counted on winning the Eastern Cape. As embarrassing as it would be for the ANC to admit, both sides used tribalism. While Zuma had KwaZulu Natal wrapped up and had been working on his support in the Eastern Cape for more than a year, Mbeki seemed to assume that in a matter of months he would pull back the province. But it was only the southern part that went his way. In Pondoland – where Mbeki had in the past relied on the late Stella Sigcau, a royal, to rally support – he was roundly defeated.

The biggest miscalculation, though, was underestimating the desire among the ANC base for change. This desire was a combination of dissatisfaction from the provinces, which had for nearly 10 years been on the receiving end of his political interference; dissatisfaction from ANC parliamentarians tired of the undermining of the institution by the executive; political dissatisfaction of the Left, marginalised since 1996; and the bitterness of a broad range of aggrieved individuals angry about unfair treatment. Add the axing of Zuma from the cabinet (and later, popular deputy health minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge), and the anti-Mbeki alliance was cemented.

In the wake of this general dissatisfaction, political battles over economic policy which Mbeki had won by hook or by crook since 1996 came back to bite him. As the picture of the leadership race became clearer over the past few months, Mbeki resorted to dangerous tactics.

One of the most shocking was the removal of Vusi Pikoli as national director of public prosecutions just as he was poised to take action against national police commissioner and Mbeki ally Jackie Selebi. Mbeki’s refusal to act against Selebi – despite the national prosecuting authority having a case against him – was a sign of desperation.

Equally bad was the manipulation of the appointment of the SABC board by individuals whom ANC parliamentarians believe to be acting on behalf of Mbeki. The caucus was told whom to vote for as board nominees by a letter purportedly from the top six ANC office-bearers.

But at least two of those officials – Lekota and secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe – say the body took no such decision. The letter proved to have been written by Mbeki ally, deputy secretary-general Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele.

Allegations of vote-buying by the Mbeki camp are rife. To name only one: Western Cape members claim a Karoo ANC “kingmaker” paid R150 000 to vote the right way at a regional conference.

From their side, the Mbeki camp allege fraud in the nominations process. Complaints have been laid to the NEC that Motlanthe allowed regional officials, who don’t have voting rights at conference, to vote in the provincial general council meetings. Fraud is also alleged in Gauteng. In the Northern Cape, some branches were allegedly excluded from the nomination process.

By early next week, the presidential election will be all over bar the shouting. For SA it is an important moment but for Mbeki, his biggest: come the vote, his place in the hagiography of ANC presidents will be determined.

For politicos, certainly, the place to be this week has to be the Limpopo capital, Polokwane – more specifically the ANC’s national congress being held at the University of Limpopo (UL) from December 15 to 20. This is where delegates will choose either Thabo Mbeki or his rival, Jacob Zuma, as party president in the most bitterly fought ANC leadership battle the party has experienced.

The university, widely known as Turfloop, is situated at the rural village of Mankweng, 30 km from Polokwane on the Tzaneen road. The Zion Christian Church is just up the road; 20 km further and you’re in the cool forest surroundings of Magoebaskloof and Haenertsburg – a stark contrast to the poor, semi-arid flatness around Mankweng.

All the hotels, lodges, guest houses and bed & breakfast places in a 60 km radius of UL were booked out two weeks ago.

“The campus is abuzz with preparation and we will rise to the occasion,” says vice-chancellor Mahlo Mokgalong. “The conference will put UL on the map.”

The University of the North, as it was known before 1994, was established in 1959 as an apartheid “bush college” in the Lebowa homeland. It has 15 000 students. It was at “Turf” that student activist Onkgopotse Abraham Tiro made his now famous speech against apartheid in April 1972, sparking widespread student protest. Tiro was killed by a parcel bomb while in exile in Botswana in 1974.

Last month students protested against fee increases. Police clamped down – but only because university property was being destroyed, say authorities.

Mokgolong says the university’s mission is to cater for students from the rural poor, so it has its financial challenges.

He is sworn to secrecy about how much the university will earn for hosting the event. Figures ranging from R5m to R20m have been bandied about. But it’s unlikely to be much in the context of UL’s R73m operating deficit.

Among UL’s former students are defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota, businessman Cyril Ramaphosa, Reserve Bank governor Tito Mboweni, judge Bernard Ngoepe, former Mpumalanga premier Mathews Phosa and former Limpopo premier Ngoako Ramatlhodi. Reuel Khoza is chancellor of UL, which merged with the Medunsa Ga-Rankuwa campus this year. Nelson Mandela and Sam Motsuenyane are former chancellors.

About 6 000 people are expected to attend the conference, including 4 075 voting delegates, non voting members from various ANC and Tripartite Alliance structures, MPs, mayors, veterans, observers from international organisations and fraternal parties worldwide, and prominent individuals such as the head of the African Union. In addition, 600 media representatives have been accredited. The voting delegates will be accommodated on campus, which has 5 000 hostel rooms, 100 staff flats, and three 10-room guest houses (in which the president and deputy president may or may not be staying – it’s a secret for security reasons).

Among the huge marquees erected for the event is the Network Lounge tent for which 28 corporate clients have each paid R160 000 to hobnob.

Many will no doubt want to break away from the formal proceedings of the congress at the end of each day.

Rank and file delegates will find dozens of bar lounges, fried chicken and other fast-food outlets in and around the two shopping centres across the road in Mankweng and surrounding villages.

Others could drive into Polokwane, passing Ster Park on the right, which the locals have nicknamed “Tender Park” since the new black elite began moving in, on speculation that they earned their money from tenders. The main road into the city is Thabo Mbeki Street, which some joke could change to Msholozi St – Zuma’s clan name – in the near future.

The elite can hit Mawetse restaurant on Jorissen Street, Cafe Pavilion on Dorp Street, Pebbles on Grobler and the Sterkloop on Church.

The Savanna Mall has the usual fast-food joints like Spur, Panarottis, Something Fishy. Downstairs is the Cock & Bull and The Bistro, which apparently “throb” at night. More relaxed is The Brazilian in the Cycad Mall and there’s a News Café down the road.

A short distance from the campus is the Magoebaskloof Hotel, which serves good food and has great views. Further down the road is the Glenshiel Hotel restaurant. For light lunches and a great ambience to restore the soul there’s Pekoe View, set in a tea plantation.

Polokwane is one of the few big cities that does not have a theatre, but then this week’s congress promises a great deal of drama. It is one of SA’s fastest-growing cities and more interesting than you’d think.

16 December is the starting date of the ANC’s national conference.4 075 is the number of delegates who will vote at the conference.

6 000 is the number of people who will attend.

R25m is what it will cost.

906 is the number of votes of the Eastern Cape, the biggest bloc.

0 is the number of votes of the SACP and Cosatu. They are observers only.

62% is the margin by which Jacob Zuma appears to be leading.

1,2% is the proportion of the population that will choose the next president of the ANC.

66 is the number of votes that each delegate will have: one for each of the six officials and 60 ordinary members.

86 is the number this could grow to, if the conference agrees to expand the national executive.

50% is the proportion of women who will be on the executive if the new female quota is accepted.

20 December the latest day by which the new ANC president will be announced.

18 months is the length of time until the next general election, when the ANC list conferences are held and the competition for positions starts again.

Source: ANC and FM research

The FM’s cover story on Jacob Zuma (November 30) was nothing but a scare story. It calls into question the magazine’s objectivity over the ANC succession issue and is an insult to the majority of the ANC branches that nominated Zuma.

When a leader says he will implement ANC policies if he becomes president and you pillory him, then one has to ask what policies Zuma should implement if not those of the ANC. The FM’s concern is business, not the poor and unemployed for whom freedom, democracy or the so-called economic miracle have no meaning.

Your analysis lacks depth. Current government (not ANC) policies have not delivered a better life for all. Government has no industrial or trade policy, public-service delivery is ineffective, corruption by rent-seeking politicians and senior civil servants is the order of the day. Parliament has been turned into a rubber stamp of the executive and the judiciary prostitutes its independence.

The Public Investment Corp and other development finance institutions have become corporate finance institutions to finance deals for cronies. Examples are the Telkom deal and the Land Bank. This is the “prudence” of President Thabo Mbeki and finance minister Trevor Manuel. There are no miracles by the finance minister except the SA Revenue Service’s effectiveness in collecting taxes. Manuel has been distributing funds to departments with little capacity to spend and to parastatals that, in a boom, have failed to perform – to the detriment of the poor. A budget surplus is a shame in the midst of babies dying in hospitals, unemployment, and lack of sanitation.

As for the arms deal, journalists have been parading their ignorance. Key questions that have propelled the support for Zuma are not asked by the media – for example: the role of Armscor in the tenders and final procurement; the absence of reference to the president as the cabinet chairman on defence procurement; and a Scorpions meeting to discuss prosecutions to influence the ANC policy conference. Such questions are asked by ordinary people.

Regarding Zuma’s sexual history, you will be shocked if you put the whole cabinet to the same test. As for Zwelinzima Vavi, he speaks not as an individual but as a voice of Cosatu, its members and working people in general – most of whom do not read the FM.

You criticise Zuma’s level of education and economic knowledge. Winston Churchill barely had a Standard 8 and another British prime minister, John Major, had no matric equivalent. Paul Volcker and Allan Greenspan, former US Federal Reserve chairmen, together with ratings agencies with all their education, are held responsible for the sub prime crisis that has cost the world’s investors trillions of dollars. The economic education of the current president has not created jobs or led to any intelligible industrial policy, credible skills development programme and public-service delivery.

Then there’s the tactic of using the gender issue to address political differences. A woman president must emerge as a credible individual with ability, not one run by a puppet master. The ANC Women’s League saw through this. The proposal of having a woman president coming from under the trousers of the president is to effectively create two centres of power that has led to political gridlock elsewhere.

There will be change if Zuma becomes president: the ANC, not people in smoke-filled rooms, will drive government policy. Hopefully the separation-of-powers principle enshrined in the constitution will be practised and rule through fear and patronage will be a thing of the past, otherwise I am afraid the poor will rise and drive those in power out.

Ngcukana is a business development director at Investec Asset Management

ANC candidate’s financial backers are determined to stay under cover

Does Jacob Zuma have his own banknote printing press? That seems to be the only way the would-be ANC and SA president can be paying for his international jaunts. For despite a series of high-cost trips, no-one admits funding the cash-strapped politician.

Just in the run-up to the ANC conference in Polokwane, Zuma and his retinue have been to India, the UK and the US. The best explanation his associates can suggest is that his flights and accommodation are paid for by R50 donations from grassroots supporters.

After India, Zuma visited London for two days last week, meeting “informally” with investors. These meetings were arranged through personal contacts – there was no official invitation from financial institutions – and few people knew the details.

The main event was a dinner at a private house at which several investment executives were present. Among them were Lloyd Pengilly, a senior executive with JP Morgan, executives from Citigroup and Deutsche Bank and several mining investors. Cell C empowerment shareholder Zwelakhe Mankazana and his new business partner and the daughter of Nelson Mandela, Zenani Dlamini, also attended.

After that, it was off to the US for five days, where his choice of hosts and venues was intriguing. In Texas, he was hosted by intelligence agency Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), an outfit once described as “the shadow CIA”.

But the sponsors of this largesse aren’t evident, and the Zuma camp isn’t giving anything away. Spokesperson Ranjeni Munusamy forwarded all queries to Zuma’s private secretary, Nontokozo Luthuli, who says: “I can’t comment.”

Of course, the funding for Thabo Mbeki’s campaign is just as opaque, but Zuma has a reputation – deserved or not – for financial associations with the wrong people.

So who funds him? The names of Don Mkhwanazi, Vivian Reddy and Tokyo Sexwale keep cropping up, but all deny giving Zuma a cent. An insider in the camp of former Gauteng premier and now businessman Sexwale, who appears to have thrown in his lot with Zuma, says: “Tokyo hasn’t provided a cent to Zuma but we believe he will become president, and South Africans had better start accepting that.”

Mkhwanazi, former chairman of the Central Energy Fund and ANC economic adviser, is a keen Zuma advocate. This week, in an amusing sideshow, he was quoted taking Zuma confidant Mo Shaik to task for patronising finance minister Trevor Manuel.

Mkhwanazi chairs the Friends of Jacob Zuma Trust, but asserts he hasn’t paid a cent from his own pocket. “However, I have raised money for the trust,” he says.

The trust, though, isn’t underwriting Zuma’s travel expenses. “The trust is ready for the lawsuits only, and is ready for any contingency that could arise on that front,” he says.

Reddy – the founder of Edison Power and one of the supporting actors in the Schabir Shaik trial – is also a denialist. “I’m not providing any financial assistance.” Nevertheless, Reddy is an ardent Zuma supporter. During the Shaik fraud trial, it emerged the Development Africa Trust paid for at least part of the R2,4m Nkandla Development Village in Zuma’s village in northern KwaZulu Natal.

Trial judge Hilary Squires said the trust, which had provided funds to Zuma, was “nothing less than the alter ego” of Reddy.

Reddy says: “The fact of the matter is that I lent Jacob Zuma money, and he paid it back.” He explains his support: “I’m an ANC member, my branch supported Jacob Zuma, and I support my branch.”

Another man linked to Zuma’s purse is London-based Paul Ekon, a man with a chequered history involving allegations of gold smuggling. But when contacted by the FM, he described himself as a “friend” and not a financial benefactor of Zuma. (See FM Fox.)

So if no previous benefactors are now bankrolling Zuma, who is? Reddy sniffs: “Zuma doesn’t need money, he is supported by his grassroots.” Reddy claims many “ordinary people” are willing to support Zuma with what they can – R50 here, R100 there. It takes a lot of pink notes, however, to muscle up the hundreds of thousands of rand that the recent overseas jaunt would have cost.

“That’s what many South Africans can’t understand: when people love a leader, they are willing to support him out of their own pocket,” says Reddy.

As an “investment facilitator” for Zuma, Mkhwanazi should know where Zuma is getting his funds. “People come to me from many different constituencies and ask: who is this man, and how can we find out what he stands for? I facilitate these meetings,” he says.

Mkhwanazi says groups – including top businessmen from around the world – invite Zuma to address them and discuss his policies, which could affect their investments. “When people invite you somewhere, they pay,” he says.

In recent months, many global investors have met Zuma. Besides the likes of Merrill Lynch, Citigroup hosted Zuma in September. Zuma told this group SA’s fiscal and monetary policies were the right ones. He denied that, if elected, there would be any “payback” to the Congress of SA Trade Unions and SA Communist Party. He also denied there would be any change in his policies, only a shift in style.

Though Mkhwanazi says most Zuma invitations come from investment houses, he points to the church as another pocket of financial support. “A friend in London, a very influential priest, told me he would like Mr Zuma to come and address him. Now, as we all know, churches are some of the richest groups in the world. Maybe we will look to organise such a visit after Polokwane,” he says.

Despite Mkhwanazi’s assertion that there is money to be made from foreign invitations, one of the US groups that hosted Zuma last week insists it was not paid. Though Texas-based Stratfor welcomed Zuma in Austin, CEO George Friedman tells the FM: “We didn’t pay for him. We don’t get involved in financing people.”

Friedman won’t name the US parties who attended because of “non disclosure agreements”. But he says those who attended fell into three main groups: investors, giant US corporations “whose revenues exceed the GDP of some countries” and educators looking for a link with SA universities.

However, the FM has learnt that one of those who attended was hedge fund manager and investment analyst John Mauldin, a Dallas businessman with interests in SA. He is a business partner of Prieur du Plessis, MD of Plexus Asset Management.

Also invited to Austin was Steve Hayes, president of the Corporate Council on Africa, an association for private-sector companies seeking business opportunities in Africa. While on the US West Coast, Zuma also spoke at the American Jewish University and at the Agape International Spiritual Centre.

What did the investors think? Says Friedman: “They think SA is an important place to be. When it comes to the question of Zuma, I think many of them came away quite comforted.”

And Friedman himself? “I found him to be a serious person, but I don’t know the issues. I can’t say that if I were South African, I would vote for him or not.” The closest he comes to endorsing Zuma is describing him as “presidential, a man who did not carelessly discuss things”.

But the question remains: if Stratfor didn’t fund the US trip, and if all the obvious sources of finance deny funding the Indian, US or UK trips, who did, and why will no-one admit to it?

It’s the same with the Polokwane conference. According to one report, it will cost R25m to stage. Some stalwarts like Reddy admit contributing to the costs, but the party is protecting the identity of most others. “It’s a private matter. We can’t expose that,” says ANC spokesman Tiyani Rikhotso.

All of this illustrates that while the pipers are playing their lungs out in the ANC, the identities of those who pay them (and, as the idiom goes, get to call the tune) remain carefully obscured.

Mankweng village, across the road from the University of Limpopo

Will Jacob Zuma and his allies have a winner-takes-all approach to the election of the all-powerful ANC national executive committee at this month’s national conference?

If so, some of the most respected figures in the ANC could be in danger of being excluded. These include ANC strategist and head of policy in the presidency Joel Netshitenzhe and long-standing and respected ANC leaders Pallo Jordan and Zola Skweyiya.

Most serving cabinet ministers are excluded from the current version of the “Youth League list”, as Zuma’s list is known. Others have been placed low on the list, raising fears that they might not get enough votes to make it into one of the 60 additional places on the executive.

Two new developments will make it even harder for experienced leadership to get elected this time around: first is the proposal to raise the quota of female members from 33% to 50%, which will have the effect of “sacrificing” men who come in near the bottom of the list; and second Cosatu has asked for changes to the “Youth League list” to accommodate more trade unionists and communists.

This will make competition for places on the executive even tighter.

It’s only if the size of the NEC is expanded from 60 to 80 that the pressure for places could be eased. The ANC policy conference left this decision open and the ANC NEC has not pronounced on the issue.

Due to the extreme polarisation of the ANC, it is not known whether branch delegates will stick to the lists circulated by the two factions or whether they will vote for more rational choices.

Jordan, one of the ANC’s most respected intellectuals, is low down on the Zuma list. He describes the faction-based lists as a “novelty”.

“There’s no evidence that in the past people’s preferences were determined by lists. But it might happen that this time, because of the polarisation, people might vote for lists,” he says.

Other seasoned ANC leaders are more worried. “As things stand, someone like Joel might not get in. With the 50% quota for women coming in, you could find some problematic exclusions. Both lists are quite weak with some odd people included,” says an ANC MP.

Judging by events in Gauteng, a Johannesburg ANC leader says he expects “the winner will take all”. He adds: “I can’t see the NEC being decided in a sober manner. The battle lines are drawn.”

Netshitenzhe’s name was removed from the provincial nomination list in KwaZulu Natal, and former and serving premiers Manne Dipico and Dipuo Peters from that of the Northern Cape.

Mbhazima Shilowa, who has openly aligned himself with President Thabo Mbeki, also occupies a lowly position on the early iterations of the Zuma list.

He warns against a “short-sighted approach of exclusions”, but adds: “If I am one of those, I won’t feel disheartened. At least I took a stand and if that is treason, then so be it.”

Shilowa also warns those “who think they are in the ascendency” not to take their victories for granted by refusing to engage in horse-trading over the NEC.

Even if individuals such as Netshitenzhe and Jordan make it onto the NEC, it is clear that a long list of the incumbents – many of them cabinet ministers – won’t. Mbeki has been heavily criticised for packing the NEC with ex-officio members whom he appointed. ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe has contemptuously described the serving NEC as a group of people concerned only about their own jobs.

A new version of the Zuma list is expected to be released soon. Early versions of the list punt a vastly different composition of the NEC and include a wide range of provincial politicians and members of parliament, most of whom have been active in the Zuma campaign.

Rather than placing established national leadership at the top of the list, the list was topped by ANC Youth League leader and MP Thandi Tobias; MP and Travelgate accused Nyami Booi; former director-general of intelligence Billy Masetlha and former ANC chief whip Tony Yengeni. Their track records bode ill for anyone outside the Zuma camp.

After two terms of President Thabo Mbeki – three if you count his role as de facto prime minister under Nelson Mandela – there is an understandable hunger for change. This is healthy. It signals suspicion of entrenched power and respect for term limits, and bodes well for democracy and renewal.

It is unfortunate, however, that whereas the disdainful Mbeki is the victim of this desire for change, its chief beneficiary should be Jacob Zuma. So deep is the yearning for a change, it seems, that just about anyone will do. Zuma, the candidate, is largely Mbeki’s creation and the president must rue the day he chose him. Perversely, Zuma has been strengthened by Mbeki’s decision to drop him from cabinet after he was tainted by the bribery and corruption for which his “financial adviser” was sent to jail. Adopted by the disgruntled socialist Left, Zuma is seen by many in the party as the victim of a conspiracy.

Alas, the last stage of grief is acceptance.

That seems to be the stage SA has reached over the prospect of Zuma ascending to the presidency of the ANC. He has undeniable popular support from most provinces and the ANC Youth and Women’s leagues, which makes his rise to the top post seem likely at the ANC’s Polokwane conference next month. From that position, assuming he achieves the majority vote of branches on the floor, the road to the presidency of the country in 2009 seems open to him.

For those to whom Mbeki has become anathema, the humiliation of the president in the battle for the party’s top post is a triumph. Yet, in the rush to depose Mbeki, what man is the ANC set to choose for itself?

Zuma has been evasive in explaining his ideological positions and policies to the public. He refuses to be interviewed about them by journalists, including the FM. He has, however, in the past month, given some insight into his thinking to the business community in various private meetings. These, together with public pronouncements during his rape trial and at various political rallies, and interviews with people close to him, have given us an image of the man.

That image is cause for concern.

Zuma appears miles away from the liberal moral philosophy that underpins our constitutional democracy. He is a social conservative. He has intimated that the press should project a positive image of the country, rather than criticise. He has said the death penalty should be revisited. His own behaviour and support for Zulu virginity testing poses significant concerns about his attitude to the rights of women. Other comments betray his homophobia.

There is certainly no reason to relax when it comes to economic policy. Though Zuma has tried to create the impression that “nothing will change”, there is no good reason to believe this. Zuma’s political career has been rescued and nourished by the Left. They will expect significant concessions from a Zuma presidency, including direct access to the levers of economic policy. Though he has said he will stick to ANC policy whatever his own views, these are weasel words – ANC policy gives room for latitude. Mbeki, too, has stuck within the ambit of party policy, but many find him far right of where they’d like him to be.

The Mbeki cabinet has been unable to get any concessions from labour to loosen up SA’s labour legislation. Under Zuma, such proposals would be dead. Labour calls to reconsider the inflation-targeting basis for monetary policy will no doubt gain traction. Budget surpluses will become a distant memory, as will tax breaks. His social conservatism is matched by his fiscal profligacy.

It is difficult to imagine that this is a man, with no formal schooling behind him, who can confidently confront difficult and complex questions on his own feet. No doubt he will surround himself with advisers, but the problem is his closest adviser is Mo Shaik, brother to fraudster Schabir Shaik. He is now responsible for the Shaik family business which has been implicated in the arms deal investigation. Shaik has held one government position – head of the national intelligence co-ordinating body – but has never had a serious engagement with policy issues.

There is scant reason to think that Zuma will find birds of a different feather once he is in a position of power. And there may be slim pickings among those at the top of the ANC.

The party’s rejection of Mbeki could extend to a rejection of those close to him when it comes to the election of the ANC’s national executive committee.

Finance minister Trevor Manuel, public administration minister Geraldine Fraser Moleketi and other capable ministers could find themselves left out. Zuma’s “business as usual” is unlikely, with big changes to the cabinet and further down in government.

Acceptance is not the right response. SA’s first three administrations have developed a public morality based on a strong sense of justice and human rights. They built a prudent fiscal framework which still allowed for huge growth in welfare. Economic policy has given space, though it could do more, for the free market and capital to grow the economy. These are achievements the whole country has benefited from. They are achievements the ANC can take credit for, as can those key cabinet members who dedicated themselves to making at times unpopular choices. It is these men and women who should now not accept the threat that Zuma represents to those achievements.

Of all the mistakes, missteps and even misfortunes of this government, nothing comes close – in proportion or lunacy – to the insanity that is the arms deal, which has poisoned the political atmosphere and tainted everything it touched.

As Thabo Mbeki’s term draws to a close, the chattering classes become ever more obsessed with his legacy. The situation in Zimbabwe, serious as it is, will probably be a footnote. It will sort itself out. His bizarre views on HIV/Aids have sowed death and confusion. That will doubtless take acres of space. Crime, too, which got out of hand on his watch, will receive some attention.

But it’s the arms deal which will define Mbeki’s presidency. It’s the one constant throughout his tenure of office. It was with him from the beginning. It will be with him – and probably bury him – in the end.

The whole thing just doesn’t make sense. It’s devoid of all logic. It’s unconscionable that a party supposedly dedicated to eradicating poverty (if that’s possible!) could, in the face of such dire need, even contemplate spending billions of rand on worthless weapons. It boggles the mind.

It’s now become a spider’s web, if not a dung heap, entangling and tarnishing all it attracts. And it’s certainly an albatross around the party’s neck. Much of the tensions in the party can be traced to the arms deal. Mbeki’s do-or-die battle with Jacob Zuma has its genesis in the arms deal. It’s led to Mbeki’s ham-handed attempts to stop Zuma’s rise. He sacked Zuma – and rightly so – for allegedly accepting a bribe from one of the arms manufacturers.

But in the bigger scheme of things, Zuma’s misdemeanour pales into insignificance. There are other much bigger fish which should have been harpooned. Mbeki, as chairman of the government task team which oversaw the buying of the weapons, must surely know of the millions, if not billions, of dollars which went into private pockets, especially those which greased Joe Modise’s palm; or the conflict of interest which plagued Chippy Shaik, head of procurement, who seemed also to have been moonlighting for his brother Schabir, now cooling his heels in jail until Zuma, his puppet, ascends to the throne.

Mbeki should know about these shenanigans – and much more. It’s inconceivable that a man of his intelligence could have presided over this rot without sniffing the stench. It beggars belief.

Conspiracy theories are fuelling Zuma’s aspirations. These charges are meant to stop his inexorable rise to the top, they say. It’s nonsense, of course. But they won’t go away unless a thorough probe is conducted, and those implicated are brought to book.

Governments can’t keep secrets – even with the best will in the world. The information scandal, which brought down apartheid strongman John Vorster, should provide a salutary lesson to our new rulers. Vorster died a broken man; and the scandal changed the course of SA’s history.

Surprisingly, the current scandal has yet to catch fire. There’s almost a reluctance or refusal to engage with the subject. Maybe the issue is simply too ghastly to contemplate; or maybe the lolly has ended up in too many pockets. It’s been left to a few diehard peaceniks and those who lost out in the lottery to keep the scandal brewing.

But Zuma could be a headache for Mbeki. He knows where the bodies are buried. And he may turn the tables on Mbeki should he succeed in his quest for the top job.

But regardless of what happens in Polokwane, Mbeki should, for the sake of his own integrity and that of his government, sort out this mess before he leaves office. It’s in his own interest that he should do so.

Otherwise history may adjudge him to have presided over a nest of vipers.

e-mail: fmeditor@fm.co.za