By Carol Paton

What are the chances that if Jacob Zuma becomes president of the ANC, he will become president of SA, too?

Rather good. His showing in the ANC provincial general councils last weekend was overwhelming. They are the bodies with the power to make the formal nominations to the national conference.

A close race had been expected but Zuma’s near two-thirds win of all the votes cast by delegates has changed the outlook on the succession battle decisively. Of course, when these same delegates get to the national conference, they could change their minds. They could still be persuaded to back President Thabo Mbeki.

They could even, as some hope, opt for a third “compromise” candidate who would need to be nominated – it would need 25% of the votes from the floor of 4 075 delegates. But with the whiff of state power in the air, would they?

The support is one thing, but the ANC also passed a resolution at its policy conference in July that the president of the party should “preferably” become the president of the country.

The most likely thing standing in the way of Zuma becoming president of SA would be a court conviction. Of course, the ANC could fail to be voted into power in 2009, but the chance is remote.

A conviction that carries at least a one-year jail sentence would disqualify him from becoming a member of parliament and hence being elected president (see page 43).

Though the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has said it is ready to charge Zuma, he still has one avenue of appeal left to him – the constitutional court – and plans to use it. The NPA is not likely to act before this issue is resolved. This will further draw out a process which has already stretched over more than two years before the main trial has even begun. As Judge Ian Farlam remarked while hearing the last round of appeals at the supreme court of appeal, an applicant could continue forever, if he had “deep-enough pockets”. In addition, it is not certain that Zuma will be charged at all.

In 18 months the ANC will more or less repeat the nomination exercise when it holds list conferences to choose its presidential and other candidates for parliament in 2009. That is the point at which Zuma would be formally nominated as the ANC’s candidate for national president. Before then, several scenarios present themselves.

The scenario best for the ANC would be an internal realignment which brings some unity between the factions, allowing Zuma to run the ANC while Mbeki runs government. But with Mbeki still holding state power, peacemaking might not be possible.

A second scenario is for Zuma to try to remove Mbeki as president. To achieve this he would have to persuade Mbeki to step down voluntarily. The constitution sets out the grounds on which the president can be removed – only for serious misconduct, violating the law or an inability to fulfil his tasks – and only by a two-thirds majority vote in parliament.

Another way would be through a resolution to dissolve parliament, which can be achieved by a simple majority vote, and an early election.

A third scenario is that Zuma bides his time until elections in 2009 and becomes president thereafter. Since the legal processes – including all the appeal processes of the main trial – could be lengthy, there’s a strong chance that Zuma will not yet be conclusively found either innocent or guilty by the time the 2009 election happens, though he may be in the midst of these legal processes.

Would Zuma’s legal troubles put ANC members off when choosing their presidential candidate?

Again, one can only speculate. But since the ANC grassroots ha ve little regard for what the media, the business world or the international community say, it would be wrong to assume that concerns about his public image would rule him out.

Assuming he has enough resources to keep the legal processes rolling, Zuma’s shot at becoming president, at least by 2009, looks like a matter of time and timing.